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INTRODUCTION1
Benjy Unger was nineteen. He was a deeply devout Orthodox Jew.
Benjy was also gay.
After years of struggling with his sexual orientation and the conflict it
generated with his religious community, first in secret and then with his
rabbis and teachers in Brooklyn, Benjy confided in his parents. His father
gave him the phone number for a “Rabbi Arthur Goldberg” and told Benjy
he’d heard Goldberg could help.
Rabbi Goldberg told Benjy that he’d called the right man. Goldberg
had helped literally hundreds of young men just like Benjy—men from
Orthodox Jewish and conservative religious communities across the
country dealing with what he called “unwanted same-sex attraction.” And
his program, his proven, scientific program, could turn Benjy straight in
two to four years.
As Rabbi Goldberg explained, Benjy wasn’t actually gay. In fact, he
assured Benjy, homosexuality didn’t exist at all. Through some
combination of a distant father, overbearing mother, and sensitive
personality, Benjy had experienced “childhood wounds” that knocked him
off the heterosexual path and generated same-sex attraction (SSA). With
time, and with the therapy Goldberg could provide, Benjy would overcome
these wounds, his SSA would diminish, and he would begin to experience
the opposite-sex attraction (OSA) he craved.
This conversation with Rabbi Goldberg left Benjy “ecstatic”; it was
*
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everything he wanted to hear. He wrote his first check and started treatment
shortly thereafter.
“Rabbi Goldberg,” however, was not a Rabbi at all, but rather a
disbarred lawyer previously convicted of conspiring to defraud the United
States.2 His organization, “Jews Offering New Alternatives to
Homosexuality,” later renamed “Jews Offering New Alternatives for
Healing” (JONAH), did not refer Benjy to a doctor, but rather sent him to
an unlicensed “life coach” whose only academic qualification was an
undergraduate degree in music and theater.3 The vaunted “JONAH
Program” relied on an obsolete set of therapeutic practices rejected by
every mainstream medical association since the mid-1970s—practices now
understood to be not only ineffective, but actively harmful.
Benjy was indeed harmed. Under the guise of treatment, Benjy’s
“therapist” Alan Downing—himself “ex-gay”—convinced the young man
to undress in one-on-one counseling sessions, while Downing stood so
close that Benjy could feel the older man’s breath on the back of his neck.
In group sessions with other “journeyers,” the term given to other clinic
patients, Benjy was instructed to slam a tennis racket into a pillow
representing his mother until his hands bled, while screaming at her for
causing him to be gay. He received what JONAH called “healthy touch,”
when he would be cradled by other “ex-gay” men decades his senior for up
to half an hour at a time. This “treatment” cost $100 per one-hour session,
with occasional $650 “weekend retreats.” By the time he left JONAH,
Benjy’s relationship with his parents was all but destroyed. Depression
rendered him nonfunctional for months. And yes, he was still gay.
Benjy Unger, like thousands of other vulnerable men and women, was
a victim of “conversion therapy,”4 a pseudoscientific treatment advertised
as capable of changing an individual’s sexual orientation. The Southern
Poverty Law Center (SPLC), alongside Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton
in New York and Lite DePalma Greenberg in New Jersey, helped Benjy
and three other victims sue Goldberg and Downing for consumer fraud5—
the first consumer fraud claim filed against conversion therapists in the
nation.6 All four victims shared the same story: Goldberg reeled them in

2

Transcript of Trial at 82, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 8,
2015).
3
Transcript of Trial at 134, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June
11, 2015).
4
The term “conversion therapy” is considered derogatory by proponents of the practice, who prefer
terms such as “gender affirming practices,” “reparative therapy,” or “sexual orientation change efforts.”
I use the term “conversion therapy” because it is the term generally used to describe the practice of
treating unwanted homosexuality through therapy, not as a derogation of those practices.
5
Complaint and Jury Demand at 1–2, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. Nov. 27, 2012).
6
Susan K. Livio, Group Claiming to Turn Gay Men Straight Committed Consumer Fraud, N.J.
Jury
Says,
NJ.COM
(June
25,
2015,
8:08
PM)
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/06/gay_conversion_therapy_fraud_trial_verdict.html
[http://perma.cc/7U33-JHQB].
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with assurances of scientifically based treatment and guarantees of a
specific cure rate; Downing then “treated” them through quack science and
talk therapy that blamed the victims’ parents for causing their
homosexuality.
On June 25, 2015, after a three-week trial, the jury needed only three
hours to deliberate before returning a unanimous verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs.7 One juror said that the decision was “cut and dried”: the JONAH
program was not therapy.8 It was unconscionable consumer fraud. In
addition to this first-in-the-nation verdict, a pretrial ruling by the Court
declared—for the first time in American history9—that homosexuality was
not a mental disease, disorder, or equivalent thereof as a matter of law.10
These twin developments, an evidentiary ruling acknowledging the
near universal consensus of the medical community that homosexuality is a
normal variant of human sexuality and a jury verdict declaring attempts to
change sexual orientation through pseudoscientific “therapies” to be
unconscionable consumer fraud, have the capacity to deal a coup de grace
to the remaining providers of conversion therapy in the United States.
Of course, one state trial court decision in New Jersey creates neither
binding precedent nor guaranteed success in future suits against conversion
therapists. The case, however, was envisioned as—and is—a powerful
model to consider in building future lawsuits. Conversion therapy enjoys
few remaining supporters in the United States, and those supporters
populate a closed universe of clinics, private practices, referral
organizations, and resource groups that all draw on the same bad science
and the same shoddy justifications for their work. The practice depends on
certain misrepresentations very similar to the misrepresentations made by
JONAH, its co-directors, and its chief therapist. These similarities and
close relationships between and among providers make JONAH a model
for holding conversion therapists accountable under state consumer fraud
laws—a blueprint for a state-level litigation campaign aimed at revealing
conversion therapy’s pervasive falsehoods.11

7

Erik Eckholm, In a First, New Jersey Jury Says Group Selling Gay Cure Committed Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES (June 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/nyregion/new-jersey-jury-says-groupselling-gay-cure-committed-fraud.html [http://perma.cc/4RL5-8JAF]; Sam Wolfe, Op-Ed: GayConversion Therapy Should Be Exposed for What It Is, Consumer Fraud, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Aug. 29,
2015, 3:00 PM) http://www.sltrib.com/opinion/2883953-155/op-ed-gay-conversion-therapy-should-beexposed [http://perma.cc/JA8F-NBZC].
8
Equality
Case
Files
(@EQCF),
TWITTER
(June
25,
2015,
1:44
PM),
https://twitter.com/EQCF/status/614172219481137152 [https://perma.cc/SB9Q-JPW6].
9
New Jersey Judge Rules Conversion Therapy Group Can’t Claim Homosexuality Is a Disorder, S.
POVERTY L. CENTER (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2015/02/10/new-jersey-judgerules-conversion-therapy-group-can%E2%80%99t-claim-homosexuality-disorder
[https://perma.cc/A39K-K328].
10
Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, Ferguson v. JONAH, No.
L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 10, 2015).
11
Cf. Wolfe, supra note 7 (calling on remaining conversion therapy providers to “come clean” as
to the nature of their services as consumer fraud).
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Part I of this Essay draws on the trial transcripts and pretrial briefing
in JONAH to argue that it is extraordinarily difficult—especially in a postJONAH world—to sell conversion therapy without simultaneously
committing consumer fraud. Part II analyzes consumer protection laws in
all fifty states to demonstrate the opportunities for and obstacles to
deploying the JONAH model across the country. Part III discusses the
merits of using litigation as a tool for curbing conversion therapy in the
United States.
I.

UNIVERSALIZING JONAH’S FACTS: THE PREDICATE LIES OF
CONVERSION THERAPY

In inducing potential clients to purchase its therapy programs, JONAH
violated New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), which prohibits the
“act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial
practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, [or]
misrepresentation . . . in connection with the sale or advertisement of any
merchandise . . . .”12
The plaintiffs identified six individual misrepresentations made by
JONAH in selling its services:
1. Homosexuality is a mental disease, disorder, or equivalent thereof;
2. Homosexuality can be cured;
3. The JONAH Program specifically could cure that illness;
4. The JONAH Program had a specific rate of success;
5. The JONAH Program worked in a specified time frame;
6. The JONAH Program was based on science.13
While certain of these misrepresentations were case-specific, the six
distill down to two core misrepresentations that must be made, in some
form or another, in any sale or provision of conversion therapy. These core
misrepresentations are:
1. Homosexuality is not a normal variant of human sexuality, but is
instead a disease, disorder, or equivalent thereof; and
2. Homosexuality can be changed through treatment.
These core misrepresentations work together to justify the peddling of
conversion therapy. JONAH told both of these lies to the plaintiffs

12

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West, Westlaw through L.2015, c. 115) (emphasis added)
[http://perma.cc/N8EC-6R9M]. “Merchandise” includes services as well as goods, and embraces
“anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale.” Id. § 56:8-1(c) (West, Westlaw through
L.2015, c. 115) [http://perma.cc/6CVT-A462].
13
Plaintiffs’ Trial Memorandum at 11–18, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. Apr. 27, 2015).
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explicitly and repeatedly through email communications, which made for
powerful evidence.14 But a suit does not need a smoking gun
communication to demonstrate the core misrepresentations; both
misrepresentations are made simply by selling the service.
First, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to separate a medical–
corrective connotation from the concept of therapy. Therapy is “treatment
especially of [a] bodily, mental, or behavioral disorder.”15 By holding
themselves out as therapists that can administer treatment capable of
ridding patients of something unwanted, even without using the precise
word “disorder,” therapists claim they can cure patients. Furthermore, the
treatments offered by conversion therapists seek to eliminate a patient’s
homosexuality by addressing its purported underlying causes, such as
“shame about the body”16 and unresolved “childhood and adolescent
wounds.”17 This pseudomedical terminology suggests that homosexuality is
a symptom, a rash that will dissipate upon application of an appropriate
ointment. It follows that therapists are selling a cure for an ailment;
homosexuality is that ailment; and homosexuality is abnormal.
The second core misrepresentation is the backbone of all conversion
therapy, and even more essential to its sale than the first. Conversion
therapists must, as a predicate to selling their services, assert that their
treatment program is capable of changing one’s sexual orientation. That is,
after all, the point of the entire enterprise. And unlike “pray away the gay”
organizations that explicitly rely on the power of faith to “heal”
homosexuality, or support groups designed to help gay men live celibate
lives in conformity with their religious values,18 conversion therapy is
billed as a scientific, therapeutic process by which a person’s sexual
orientation can change from gay to straight. There simply is no conversion
therapy without the possibility for conversion.
Even in a hypothetical where a conversion therapist told his client, “I
have absolutely no idea whether homosexuality is normal or abnormal; all I
know is that my program can change your sexual orientation,” both core

14

See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 25, 2015) (“[S]ame-sex attraction (SSA) is just a SYMPTOM of underlying pain from unresolved
childhood wounds.”); Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 14, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. June 25, 2015) (“The simple answer is, ‘yes, it’s possible to actually be fully rid of SSA.’”).
15
Therapy,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE
DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/therapy (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) [http://perma.cc/22FP-FFTH]; see also, e.g.,
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., No. 09-5675, 2010 WL 3620203, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10,
2010) (“Medical dictionaries define ‘therapy’ as the ‘treatment of disease.’”) [http://perma.cc/BY5KNTBH].
16
Transcript of Trial at 241–42, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 11, 2015).
17
Id. at 38.
18
See, e.g., JOEL 2:25 INT’L, http://www.joel225.org/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (“As a Christian
community, we proactively engage and affirm men and women throughout the world who experience
same-sex attraction, providing ongoing prayerful support that encourages relational healing, sexual
sobriety, and spiritual growth.”) [http://perma.cc/WJ4G-HCAJ].
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misrepresentations are present. The second certainly has been made: the
therapist has promised his program can work. The first has been made as
well: conversion therapy views homosexuality as symptomatic, caused by
certain underlying psychological issues to be addressed through a
therapeutic program. The sale of this program is also the sale of this
model—the moment a conversion therapist actually begins therapy and
asks about a client’s relationship with his mother, or about his relationship
with his peer group, or whether he was sexually abused as a child, he has
pathologized homosexuality as an aberration caused by those “wounds.”
An assumption of abnormality proceeds from the course of treatment, even
if the therapist is exactingly careful never to describe homosexuality itself
as disordered.19
Not all therapy aimed at assisting the religious conservative LGBT
population, of course, qualifies as conversion therapy. A therapist might
offer services not intended to “change” one’s homosexuality, but instead
intended to reduce the intensity of an individual’s perceived attractions, or
to teach coping mechanisms designed to enable a patient to live a chaste
lifestyle in alignment with his religious beliefs. While one may wish (and
work) for a world where no individual felt compelled to reject his or her
innate sexuality in order to comply with religious dogma, these services
can be and are provided in a respectful, healthy manner,20 and are not aimed
at “converting” individuals from gay to straight. However, while
individuals should be free to prioritize their religious beliefs and seek to
live in accordance with those beliefs, this does not permit others to lie to
them while selling services designed to assist in that prioritization.
Consumer fraud laws reject such a stark notion of caveat emptor—
sometimes explicitly.21 If therapy is intended to reduce or eliminate an
individual’s SSA and/or increase his OSA, if it is designed or marketed to
“convert” that individual from gay to straight, both core misrepresentations
I describe below must have been made to the patient as a matter of logic.
19

Should a therapist tell a potential client that homosexuality is entirely normal, but still offer
services purporting to change one’s sexual orientation, the second core misrepresentation is certainly
present—that therapist is promising a result he cannot deliver. Proving the first core misrepresentation
would be more difficult, but still possible; a plaintiff would need to demonstrate that statements made to
him during the course of treatment pathologized homosexuality by keying it to any of the major
“causes” of homosexuality posited by conversion therapists (such as a masculinity deficit, or childhood
sexual trauma, or the “triadic family” described infra note 26 and accompanying text). Even if the first
core misrepresentation has not been made, however, the second certainly has—and it takes only one
misrepresentation to violate consumer fraud laws.
20
Consider for example a therapist who, while confirming to his clients that homosexuality is a
perfectly normal variant of human sexuality, works to reduce feelings of shame and stigma attached to a
patient’s orientation and, if the patient wishes, helps him create healthy coping mechanisms so he can
conform his sexual behavior to his religious beliefs. Critically, the ill sought to be corrected by this
form of therapy is the discomfort the patient experiences due to the conflict between his sexual
orientation and his religion, not the orientation itself.
21
See, e.g., NEW JERSEY MODEL CIVIL JURY CHARGE 4.43: CONSUMER FRAUD ACT at 2 (2011),
available at https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/civil/charges/4.43.pdf (“Many of us have heard the Latin
phrase caveat emptor: ‘let the buyer beware.’ That statement allows little relief to a customer. That
statement does not reflect current law in New Jersey. Here, we have a more ethical approach in business
dealings with one another.”) [https://perma.cc/AUG2-9N65].
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Over the course of the JONAH trial, both of these essential, core
misrepresentations were proven to be fraudulent misrepresentations of fact.
A. Homosexuality Is Abnormal
Arthur Goldberg gave the same pitch to each of the plaintiffs in the
JONAH case, a pitch he’d given hundreds of times.22 There was no such
thing as homosexuality, he said; the mainstream media and radical gay
activists created the term. Homosexuality is just a symptom of childhood
wounds inflicted by the parents, he explained, that resolves itself if
addressed in therapy. “JONAH’s Psycho-Educational Model for Healing
Homosexuality,” posted on the JONAH website, went so far as to invent a
term for homosexuality: “Same-Sex Attraction Disorder.”23
JONAH’s position is consistent with the discredited model for
homosexuality articulated by Dr. Joseph Nicolosi, one of the fathers of
modern conversion therapy24 and one of its most vocal proponents.25 The
“triadic family” model of an overbearing mother, distant father, and
sensitive child26 is not the only “cause” of homosexuality subscribed to by
conversion therapists, but it is one of the most popular.27 It is also
remarkably flexible: Michael Ferguson, the named plaintiff in the JONAH
case, testified that his therapy with Alan Downing focused on identifying
examples of his father’s failings and his mother’s overprotectiveness,
especially in the beginning.28 Many of these issues, like a father being away
22

Transcript of Trial at 86, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 8,

2015).
23

Elaine Silodor Berk & Arthur A. Goldberg, JONAH’s Psycho-Educational Model for Healing
Homosexuality, JONAH INT’L, http://jonahweb.org/library_article/view/jonah-39-s-psycho-educationalmodel-for-healing-homosexuality.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (“There is no ‘magic bullet’ for
healing even though it is frequently wished for by those suffering from a same-sex attraction disorder
(SSAD).”) [http://perma.cc/3W6A-R5VT].
24
See Finding a Counselor or Life Coach: David H. Pickup, MA, LMFT, PEOPLE CAN CHANGE,
http://www.peoplecanchange.com/support/counselor.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (“David underwent
an extensive internship and training with the creator of Reparative Therapy, Dr. Joseph Nicolosi at
Thomas Aquinas Psychological Clinic.”) [http://perma.cc/4RB2-UDLX].
25
See, e.g., Joseph Nicolosi, What Is Reparative Therapy? Examining the Controversy, JOSEPH
NICOLOSI PH.D., http://www.josephnicolosi.com/what-is-reparative-therapy-exa/ (last visited Nov. 2,
2015) (detailing Nicolosi’s theory of homosexuality and program for treatment) [http://perma.cc/8FFXK7XN].
26
See Joseph Nicolosi, Attachment Loss and Grief Work in Reparative Therapy, JOSEPH NICOLOSI
PH.D., http://www.josephnicolosi.com/attachment-loss-and-grief-work/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2015)
(detailing the “triadic narcissistic family” model and claiming it contributes to the development of
homosexuality in males) [http://perma.cc/L3YB-2N9A].
27
It is also completely unscientific. “There are no empirical studies or peer-reviewed research that
support theories attributing same-sex sexual orientation to family dysfunction or trauma.” AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON
APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 54 (2009), available at
https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXY8-Q2HE].
28
Transcript of Trial at 220–23, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 16, 2015). Downing’s treatment notes for Mr. Ferguson include entire sessions examining “What
didn’t I get from Dad” and hypothetical questions from Michael to his mother along these same lines.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 433 at 6, 10, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 25,
2015).
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for work or a mother enrolling him in extracurricular activities, seem like
perfectly natural components of life in a typical middle-class American
nuclear family. But in the hands of Downing, these childhood memories
were twisted into a narrative of Ferguson’s parents “causing” his
homosexuality.
In JONAH, the battle over this misrepresentation was largely fought
and won in expert discovery. JONAH proffered six experts: four
conversion therapists (including Dr. Nicolosi), one medical doctor, and one
rabbi. All four therapists submitted reports claiming, among other things,
that homosexuality is a learned response to childhood “wounds” and is
addressable through therapy aimed at resolving those wounds. They argued
that this school of thought, while unpopular, presented a coherent argument
for homosexuality as a learned or acquired disorder, or at least not as a
normal variant of human sexuality. Each of these individuals failed to
qualify as experts under New Jersey law, and each was excluded.29
New Jersey is a Frye state.30 As such, the reliability of proffered
expert testimony can be proven by showing its “general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.”31 The Court, in its ruling excluding
JONAH’s experts, declared that “[t]he overwhelming weight of scientific
authority concludes that homosexuality is not a disorder or abnormal. The
universal acceptance of that scientific conclusion—save for outliers such as
JONAH—requires that any expert opinions to the contrary must be
barred.”32
This statement is not controversial. In 1973, the American Psychiatric
Association removed homosexuality per se from the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,33 the standard desk reference for
psychiatrists in the United States.34 Since then, the pattern has been
29

Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12, at 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015).
I note that proffered conversion therapy experts excluded under Frye are likely to be excluded
under the Daubert standard as well. Daubert requires judges to determine whether a proffered expert’s
opinion is based on a valid, scientific methodology. Under this standard, the factors that may be
considered in determining whether an expert’s methodology is valid are: (1) whether the theory or
technique in question can be and has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) its known or potential error rate; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling its operation; and (5) whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant
scientific community. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993)
[http://perma.cc/C6B2-CJKY]. A casual glance at the universally refuted, fringe nature of conversion
therapy suggests it fails at least on factors (1), (2), and (5).
31
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) [http://perma.cc/77R8-L8QQ].
32
Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12, at 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015) (emphasis
added).
33
Position Statement (Retired), Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Homosexuality and Sexual Orientation
Disturbance: Proposed Change in DSM-II, 6th Printing, page 44, APA Document Reference No.
730008
(Dec.
1973),
available
at
http://www.torahdec.org/downloads/dsmii_homosexuality_revision.pdf [http://perma.cc/YB85-5JS9].
34
Frequently Asked Questions, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N: DSM-5 DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.dsm5.org/about/Pages/faq.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2015) (“The Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is the handbook used by health care professionals in the United
States and much of the world as the authoritative guide to the diagnosis of mental disorders.”)
[http://perma.cc/KU4A-KHUD].
30
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unbroken: each and every major medical and mental health association in
the United States has concluded that homosexuality is a normal variant of
human sexuality.35 In an amicus brief in United States v. Windsor, the
American Psychological Association stated:
For decades . . . the consensus of mental health professionals and researchers
has been that homosexuality and bisexuality are normal expressions of human
sexuality and pose no inherent obstacle to leading a happy, healthy, and
productive life, and that gay and lesbian people function well in the full array
of social institutions and interpersonal relationships.36

JONAH pointed to the existence of certain niche groups advocating
for a pathological understanding of homosexuality, most notably the
National Association for the Research and Therapy of Homosexuality
(NARTH),37 as proof that general acceptance of homosexuality as a normal
variant of human sexuality did not exist.38 The Frye standard, however,
does not require unanimity.39 As the Court stated, “a group of a few closely
associated experts cannot incestuously validate one another as a means of
establishing the reliability of their shared theories.”40
In other words, the mere existence of a fringe viewpoint did not defeat
the consensus of the wider medical and scientific community. After all, a
discredited scientific theory is by definition unreliable, and “the theory that
homosexuality is a disorder is not novel but—like the notion that the earth

35

See, e.g., Barbara L. Frankowski et al., Sexual Orientation and Adolescents, 113 PEDIATRICS
1827, 1827–28 (2004) [http://perma.cc/6A9Q-LCE5]; AMA Policies on LGBT Issues: Patient-Centered
Policies: H-160.991 Health Care Needs of the Homosexual Population, AM. MED. ASS’N,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/member-groups-sections/glbt-advisorycommittee/ama-policy-regarding-sexual-orientation.page? (last visited Nov. 8, 2015) (“Our AMA . . .
opposes, the use of ‘reparative’ or ‘conversion’ therapy that is based upon the assumption that
homosexuality per se is a mental disorder. . . .”) [http://perma.cc/N8SY-EGHB]; Appropriate
Counseling Responses to Sexual Orientation, Am. Counseling Ass’n, ACA Governing Council Meeting
Minutes,
(March
26–27,
1998),
available
at
http://www.counseling.org/Sub/Minutes/
Governing_Council/1998_0326.pdf (affirming that “homosexuality is not a mental disorder”)
[http://perma.cc/32UZ-TMZS]; Position Statement, Royal Coll. of Psychiatrists, Royal College of
Psychiatrists’
Statement
on
Sexual
Orientation
(Apr.
2014),
available
at
https://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/pdf/PS02_2014.pdf (“The College wishes to clarify that homosexuality is
not a psychiatric disorder.”) [https://perma.cc/YHN9-GPC4].
36
See Brief of the American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae on the Merits in
Support of Affirmance at 8–9, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) (2013)
[http://perma.cc/J8SL-ZS7V]. The brief was filed on behalf of the American Psychological Association,
the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric
Association, the American Psychoanalytic Association, the California Medical Association, the
National Association of Social Workers, and the New York State Psychological Association.
37
NARTH was recently rebranded as the “clinical division” of the “Alliance for Therapeutic
Choice and Scientific Integrity.” See NARTH INST., http://www.therapeuticchoice.com/#!narthinstitute/c1hul (last visited Nov. 8, 2015) [http://perma.cc/S2GS-QS9G].
38
Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Defendants’ Experts at 10–11, Ferguson
v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015).
39
See State v. Tate, 505 A.2d 941, 950 (N.J. 1986) (holding general acceptance “does not depend
on unanimous belief or universal agreement within the scientific community”) [http://perma.cc/LM9D5A7A].
40
Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12, at 26 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015).
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is flat and the sun revolves around it—instead is outdated and refuted.”41
JONAH’s experts were therefore excluded from testifying at trial.42
In disposing of cross motions for summary judgment, and based on
this previous evidentiary ruling, the court ruled that it was a
misrepresentation in violation of the New Jersey CFA to state that
homosexuality was not a normal variation of human sexuality, but was
instead a mental illness, disorder, or equivalent thereof.43 The court held
that homosexuality is not a sickness—as a matter of law.
It is essential to understand the importance of this finding to the
JONAH case, and to future cases built on the JONAH model. The plaintiffs’
main source of evidence in JONAH, beyond the testimony of the parties
themselves, came from the JONAH email listserv, which functioned as a
propaganda machine for the JONAH clinic.44 Other evidence available to
prove the disease–disorder misrepresentation included marketing materials
for group and individual therapy sessions, emails to potential clients offlistserv, and communications between Goldberg, Berk, and other
conversion therapy providers (among much else). Because the standard
conversion therapy business model is based on the lie that homosexuality is
abnormal, this lie—a lie as a matter of law—appeared everywhere in
JONAH’s communications and operations. The same is likely true with
other providers of the same service.45
B. Homosexuality Can Be Changed Through Treatment
The “JONAH Program” had three major components: (1) individual
therapy with Alan Downing or another JONAH counselor; (2) group
therapy sessions led by Downing or Goldberg at the JONAH offices in
Jersey City; and (3) referrals for “Journey Into Manhood” weekend retreats
run by another conversion therapy organization, People Can Change.46 The
41

Id. at 25.
Id. at 26, 31.
43
Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, Ferguson v. JONAH, No.
L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 10, 2015).
44
JONAH co-directors used the listserv to reinforce the message that their clients had a problem
that needed to be solved. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 164 at 1, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 25, 2015) (“All men are born straight. They become SSA because of
emotional wounds typically in childhood.”); Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 183, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-547312 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 25, 2015) (“JONAH is in big trouble with gay activists just because we say no
one is born gay and people can change. These myths are what has convinced the public that
homosexuality is normal and inborn . . . .”); Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 159 at 1, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 25, 2015) (“I’ve known . . . alcoholics who must have 3 drinks
every night – but function OK in their lives. However, it doesn’t make their alcoholism or obesity good
or normal. It’s the same with SSA.”).
45
For example, The “International Healing Foundation,” a referral service linking potential clients
with conversion therapists, prominently features “causes” of homosexuality including “HeteroEmotional Wounds,” “Body Image Wounds,” and “Sexual Abuse” on its website. Potential Causes of
SSA, INT’L HEALING FOUND.: COMING OUT . . . LOVED, http://www.comingoutloved.com/causes-of-ssa
(last visited Nov. 8, 2015) [http://perma.cc/AS3U-X42T].
46
See Transcript of Trial at 138–39, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 8, 2015).
42
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JONAH Program, Goldberg assured his clients, had a two-in-three chance
of success of changing their sexuality.47
But JONAH kept no client records. There were no exit surveys, no
follow-up questionnaires—no systematic communication of any kind with
clients who had left the program.48 The statistics quoted by Goldberg were
either entirely fictional or based on Goldberg’s own memories of past
clients and selective recall of studies on the subject.49
Studies that purport to show that homosexuality can be changed
through conversion therapy and similar programs certainly exist.50 The
American Psychological Association addressed those studies exhaustively
in its 2009 publication, Report of the American Psychological Association
Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation.51
This report engaged in a systematic review of research on the efficacy of
sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE), revealing “substantial
deficiencies” in the studies claiming to demonstrate its efficacy.52 These
deficiencies included lack of internal validity due to sample attrition and
variability in outcome measures, small or skewed sample populations in
recent studies containing only self-reports by religiously conservative adult
males,53 and inappropriate selection and performance of statistical tests.54
The Task Force concluded that, given the dearth of scientifically sound
research, “claims that recent SOCE is effective are not supported.”55 Dr.
Lee Beckstead, one of the authors of the Task Force Report, testified that
none of the treatments JONAH employed were, or could be, effective at
changing an individual’s sexual orientation.56
In the course of its review, the Task Force also identified evidence that
SOCE was, in fact, harmful.57 But whether or not current conversion
47

Id. at 155. Or a “substantial” chance. Id. at 156. Or a 70 to 75% chance. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit
116 at 1, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 25, 2015). It depended on
the day.
48
Transcript of Trial at 158–59, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 8, 2015).
49
See id. at 164–55 (describing books, studies, and a two-thirds success rate).
50
See generally JAMES E. PHELAN, SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION CHANGE
EFFORTS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (2014) (collecting studies claiming to show positive
outcomes from conversion therapy). I note that the author of this booklet, Dr. James Phelan, admitted in
the course of the JONAH case that he did not test the validity of any of the studies cited in the text. See
Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Exclude Defendants’ Experts at 32, Ferguson v.
JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015). He was subsequently barred from
testifying as an expert. Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Defendants’ Expert Witnesses at
2, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015).
51
AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, supra note 27 (2009).
52
Id. at 34, 39–40.
53
Id. at 52.
54
Id. at 34.
55
Id. at 2.
56
Transcript of Trial at 39–40, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June
16, 2015).
57
Early SOCE included aversive techniques such as electroshock therapy; studies of these aversive
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therapy techniques actively harm patients, the techniques themselves are
considered unethical in the mental health field. At trial, Dr. Carol
Bernstein, a past president of the American Psychiatric Association and
director of the psychiatric residency program at New York University’s
medical school, testified that major treatment methods in JONAH’s
conversion therapy program—nudity in individual therapy, extended
holding between therapist and client, re-creation of sexual abuse and other
traumatic experiences, and anger transference exercises, among other
things—were so far outside the ethical bounds of the psychiatric profession
that, should one of Dr. Bernstein’s residents practice them, it would
warrant disciplinary action up to and including expulsion.58
Faced with expert testimony demonstrating that their science was
flawed and that their methods were unethical, the defendants in JONAH
turned to anecdotal evidence. They cited testimonials from clients—
including contemporaneous statements from the plaintiffs themselves—
saying they felt their SSA decreasing through treatment, and that they felt
themselves becoming more attracted to women. Some of these clients
declared that they thought various portions of the defendants’ program,
including weekend retreats featuring extended “healthy touch” sessions and
“guts work” like Benjy’s mother-beating session, were incredibly positive
experiences.59
Dr. Janja Lalich, a sociologist specializing in the study of coercive
influence, testified as an expert for the plaintiffs. She explained that these
sorts of affirmations, often made immediately after emotionally charged
experiences, were expected.60 JONAH, and organizations like it, combined
a closed philosophy with regular message reinforcement and targeted
recruiting to coerce individuals into complying with its belief structure,
even when the effects were harmful.61
This pattern of coercive influence was clear at JONAH. The plaintiffs
in JONAH were told the program worked—and that if it didn’t work, it was
because they hadn’t worked hard enough to change.62 They were reminded,
constantly, that being gay meant leading a lonely life ending in disease and
early death.63 They came from religiously conservative environments in
treatments showed high dropout rates and iatrogenic effects on patients. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N,
supra note 27, at 43 (2009). The Task Force found that recent research on nonaversive SOCE also
included patient reports of perceived harm, though mixed with patient reports of perceived benefit. Id.
58
Transcript of Trial at 175–78, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 10, 2015).
59
See, e.g., Defendants’ Exhibit 29, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 25, 2015) (“I definitely felt like the energy at [Journey Into Manhood] was deeply healing for
me . . . .”); Defendants’ Exhibit 78, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June
25, 2015) (“I miss the friendship [sic] the acceptance, the love, and I just miss all of you.”).
60
Transcript of Trial at 167–68, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 15, 2015).
61
Id. at 113–16.
62
Transcript of Trial at 54–55, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June
11, 2015).
63
Id. at 64–66. Indeed, the co-director of JONAH claimed that no gay couple had maintained, or
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which homosexuality was not accepted. They were told they needed to
“commit” to the work. In such a situation, Dr. Lalich explained, anyone
would be expected to claim they felt the treatment was working—as failure
was the individual’s fault, not the organization’s, and questioning that
assumption could lead to removal from the group.64 But as Dr. Bernstein
testified, just because a client says, or even thinks, a treatment is beneficial
doesn’t mean it actually is beneficial.65 It can, in fact, be quite harmful—the
“high” experienced by individuals caught in a system of coercive influence
is generally followed by an emotional “crash.”66
In a last-ditch effort to demonstrate that their treatments could work,
the defense called seven “success story witnesses”: men who claimed to
have successfully completed a course of conversion therapy. The first
success story witness testified that though he was married and considered
himself a success, he was still predominately attracted to men.67 Another
testified that while he no longer considered himself to be gay, he did not
experience sexual fantasies about women.68 The remaining “success
stories” were similar; not one witness testified that he now experienced
regular opposite-sex attraction.
The risk of a future conversion therapist defendant finding better
success stories is low. These witnesses were selected from a pool of
approximately twenty of the best candidates from an initial pool of
approximately one hundred volunteers, all past participants in People Can
Change’s weekend conversion therapy retreats.69 These were, in other
words, the best “success” stories available.
In order to demonstrate the misrepresentation that homosexuality is
curable through treatment, a future plaintiff would only need to show that
his therapist asserted that the program was effective. From there, a lack of
scientific and anecdotal proof demonstrates the statement is at best
misleading and at worst false. Even if the therapist in question maintains
client records purporting to show that certain of his clients have selfreported as “successful,” further investigation of these “success stories”
may well reveal that the clients self-reporting success are using an unusual
could maintain, a monogamous relationship for more than five years. Id. at 64.
64
Transcript of Trial at 260–61, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 15, 2015).
65
Transcript of Trial at 174–75, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 10, 2015).
66
Transcript of Trial at 167, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June
15, 2015).
67
Transcript of Trial at 210, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 17, 2015).
This man was also the sitting Chairman of the Board of Directors of North Star International, a major
conversion therapy resource organization, at the time of trial. Id. at 203.
68
Transcript of Trial at 21–23, 38, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 18, 2015). The witness explained that his goal was not to sexually fanaticize about women, as it
was not consistent with his religious values. Id. at 38.
69
See Transcript of Trial at 101, 194, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. June 24, 2015).
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definition of the term, similar to the “success story witnesses” in JONAH.
Such stories reveal that the only impact of conversion therapy is a shallow
ability to reclaim the title of “straight” while experiencing no authentic
change in sexual attraction.
Conversion therapy does not work because conversion therapy cannot
work, in the sense that it cannot “cure” homosexuality. This core
misrepresentation is made every time a conversion therapist accepts
payment for “treatment” and every time a therapist provides so-called
“therapy.”
II.

PROJECTING JONAH NATIONWIDE: A SURVEY OF STATE
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS

Having demonstrated the fallacies of the two core misrepresentations
in JONAH that are commonly present in the sale and provision of
conversion therapy, I turn to analyze the state-level consumer protection
laws that makes those misrepresentations illegal. Every state has passed a
consumer protection law and granted private citizens the right to enforce
the law through a civil cause of action.70 While New Jersey’s CFA is
particularly plaintiff-friendly, a nationwide survey of other states’
consumer protection laws reveals there are many other jurisdictions where
a JONAH-modeled case could easily be brought.
A. The New Jersey Model
The New Jersey CFA offered a potent mix of incentives for bringing
an experimental suit against a conversion therapist. Four features of the
New Jersey CFA are particularly salient here: (1) lack of an intent or
knowledge requirement on the part of defendants, (2) lack of a reliance
requirement on the part of plaintiffs, (3) availability of equitable relief, and
(4) availability of attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs. Additionally, a
prima facie case under the CFA consists of only three elements: (1)
unlawful conduct, (2) ascertainable loss by the defendant, and (3) a causal
relationship between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss.71 “An
intent to deceive is not a prerequisite to the imposition of liability.”72 The
New Jersey CFA “is designed to protect the public even when a merchant
acts in good faith.”73 Perhaps most importantly, a potential plaintiff need
not prove she relied on the unlawful conduct, merely that the conduct
occurred and caused harm. “A practice can be unlawful even if no person

70

See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, STATE
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF PRIVATE LITIGATION PRELIMINARY
REPORT 53–55 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1708175.
71
See Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 964 A.2d 741, 749 (N.J. 2009) [http://perma.cc/W7NNPCC5].
72
Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 365 (N.J. 1997) [http://perma.cc/K4TF-6Z4P].
73
Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 461 (N.J. 1994) [http://perma.cc/DM6U-5C97].
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was in fact misled or deceived thereby.”74 This broad cause of action,
combined with the availability of trebled compensatory damages,75
attorney’s fees,76 and toothy equitable relief77 makes New Jersey’s CFA one
of the broadest, and most protective, in the country. Each of the four
features that make the New Jersey CFA so attractive will be discussed in
turn below.
First, consumer fraud laws that do not require demonstrating that the
defendant either knew or intended his actions to be fraudulent are
especially important in the conversion therapy context, where religious
beliefs and pseudoscientific “evidence” are never far from the “treatment”
room. Such laws eliminate the “true believer” problem, which arises when
conversion therapists can say they disagree with prevailing science and
believe their practices work in an attempt to shield themselves from
consumer fraud liability.
Second, the absence of a reliance requirement opens the world of
evidence available to a plaintiff to prove his claim to all salient
misrepresentations made by the defendant, rather than limiting available
evidence to examples of misrepresentations made directly to the plaintiff.
As described above, conversion therapists typically build their businesses
on twin lies that permeate their communications and treatment programs.
While therapists typically make these two lies to individual plaintiffs in the
course of selling their services, a plaintiff bringing a claim in a non-reliance
jurisdiction will also be able to offer other examples of defendants making
these lies—a wide array of evidence which, in JONAH, proved
overwhelming.
Third, every state’s consumer fraud regime provides for the
application of equitable relief to enjoin the continuance of a fraud on the
public.78 This power is vested in the attorney general of the state, and often
extended to a citizen bringing a private right of action. In New Jersey, for
example, a private citizen is able to seek injunctive relief in addition to
compensatory damages and attorney’s fees, which is valuable because it
allows the reach of a private lawsuit to go far beyond simple monetary
damages: a victim can enjoin a conversion therapist from continuing to
perpetrate fraud on the public in the same courtroom, without having to
seek redress through the state attorney general. In JONAH, that meant a
permanent injunction requiring the clinic to close its doors forever, and
prohibiting the therapists employed by JONAH from ever practicing
74

Id. at 462.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West, Westlaw through L.2015, c. 115) [http://perma.cc/D76P7TAP].
76
Id.
77
Id. § 56:8-8 (granting individuals, in addition to the attorney general, the power to seek equitable
relief in a private cause of action for consumer fraud, in addition to the attorney general)
[http://perma.cc/6HPZ-3ZTC].
78
See Appendix.
75
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conversion therapy again.79
Fourth, the availability of attorney’s fees makes private actions
possible where they might not otherwise be. JONAH, as an anecdotal
example, required over thirty fact depositions, seven expert depositions,
several rounds of motions to dismiss and summary judgment briefing, and
a three-week trial. This is enormously expensive. The jury’s awards for
compensatory damages, on the other hand, were relatively small, ranging
from several hundred dollars to just over $17,000.80 Providing for
attorney’s fees makes this protracted litigation feasible for plaintiffs and
their lawyers—and provides a further monetary penalty against defendant
therapists when the plaintiffs prevail.
While New Jersey’s CFA made the state a favorable incubator for a
consumer fraud case against conversion therapists, it is not the only nest in
the tree. Many jurisdictions offer similar core protections to the New Jersey
CFA, such that victims of conversion therapists would be able to structure a
claim similar to the one in JONAH. Other states’ statutory regimes may
differ from New Jersey’s by requiring either reliance or a showing of
intent. Though these heightened burdens are inconvenient in proving the
fraud of conversion therapy, they are not insurmountable. And while a
limited number of states have restrictive consumer protection laws that
would make a JONAH-model suit difficult, these outliers are vastly
outnumbered by jurisdictions where conversion therapy is more vulnerable
to attack than ever before.
What follows is a fifty-state survey of state consumer protection laws.
All states make available a private cause of action. The survey focuses on
how closely the laws conform to New Jersey on the four above-stated
features of nonreliance, nonintent, equitable relief, and attorney’s fees.
Details on each state, including specific statutory references and citations to
relevant case law, are available in the Appendix to this Essay.
B. Copycat Jurisdictions
Several state CFAs match the New Jersey CFA on all four critical
metrics: lack of an intent requirement, lack of a reliance requirement,
availability of equitable relief, and availability of attorney’s fees. These
states are Alaska, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas,81
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee,
79

See Press Release, Southern Poverty Law Center, Groundbreaking SPLC Lawsuit Forces New
Jersey Group to Cease Bogus ‘Conversion Therapy’ Program, Pay Damages (Dec. 18, 2015), available
at
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/121815_jonah_settlement_press_release_final.pdf
[perma.cc/2RBN-BDK4].
80
Jury Verdict Sheet at 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 25, 2015).
81
The general prohibition of deceptive acts and practices at Kan. Stat. § 50-626(a) does not require
intent; however, many of the specific prohibitions at § 50-626(b) do. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-626
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) [http://perma.cc/285J-SFP6]. Conversion therapy services fall
under the general prohibition against deceptive acts and practices; I therefore include Kansas as a
copycat jurisdiction for this specific purpose. The same holds true for Illinois, Michigan, and Oregon.
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Vermont, and Washington.
C. Requiring Reliance: An Evidentiary Problem and Solution
Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming have imposed
a reliance requirement on consumer fraud plaintiffs, either in the statute
itself or in subsequent state court decisions.82 It is, however, impossible to
state with certainty that these are the only states that would require a civil
plaintiff to show that she relied on the statements made by the defendant to
prove a consumer fraud claim because many state CFA statutes are silent as
to reliance and the courts in those states have yet to address the question
directly.83
While a complete review of the reliance requirements in each state is
beyond the scope of this Essay, an example analysis applying JONAH’s
facts in a state with a reliance requirement demonstrates how the additional
hurdle of proving reliance might be overcome.
Georgia’s courts have read a reliance requirement into the state’s
consumer fraud law.84 This requirement mandates that “a claimant who
alleges [Georgia’s consumer protection law] was violated as the result of a
misrepresentation must demonstrate that he was injured as the result of the
reliance upon the alleged misrepresentation.”85
In JONAH, where there was no reliance requirement, the plaintiffs
needed only to show JONAH made misrepresentations and that the
plaintiffs suffered ascertainable loss. This opened the door to evidence of
communications between the defendants and non-party clients. The
plaintiffs were not privy to such communications in purchasing JONAH’s
services, and thus the communications could not have served as the basis of
their decision to purchase the defendants’ services.
This sort of evidence would be irrelevant in a JONAH-modeled case in
Georgia, as the specific misrepresentations must be tied to the plaintiff’s
decision to purchase the service. But the requirement does not defeat the
claim. It merely restricts the acceptable evidence available for proving it.
While the plaintiffs in JONAH had access to a veritable bounty of emails
and advertisements from the defendants to a variety of third parties which
could be used to prove the defendants misrepresented their services, they
also had sufficient evidence of the misrepresentations as delivered to the
plaintiffs personally: email messages between plaintiff and defendant,
intake questionnaires for their therapist, applications to weekend retreats,

82

See Appendix.
See Appendix.
84
See Tiismann v. Linda Martin Holmes Corp., 637 S.E.2d 14, 16–17 (Ga. 2006) (citing Zeeman v.
Black, 273 S.E.2d 910, 916 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) [http://perma.cc/9PKG-E2UZ])
[http://perma.cc/U8HP-ZRZT].
85
Zeeman, 273 S.E.2d at 916.
83
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and their own direct testimony. In a situation where potential plaintiffs
have retained neither paperwork nor email records from their entire courses
of therapy, their own oral testimony to the fact that the misrepresentations
were made to them and the fact that they purchased services will still be
available in making out their claims.
Certain potential plaintiffs may face specific factual difficulties in
proving reliance. One JONAH plaintiff, for example, was in medical school
during his course of therapy, and had significant experience with
conversion therapists before he came to JONAH.86 Had the plaintiffs been
forced to show that he relied on the defendants’ misrepresentations in
electing to purchase treatment from JONAH, the defendants would have
had colorable arguments that a future medical doctor who had been
exposed to the defendants’ theories many times before could not
reasonably rely on the defendants’ pseudoscientific assertions as to their
program’s efficacy. Should similar situations arise in future cases,
testimony from experts such as Dr. Lalich on the psychology of coercive
influence may help a jury determine what is “reasonable reliance” in the
context of a sheltered, conservative religious community—but there are
admittedly no guarantees. Requiring plaintiffs to show they relied on the
bald-faced lies of a conversion therapist complicates their claims, but does
not necessarily make such claims impossible.
D. Requiring Intent: Dealing With True Believers
Certain state CFAs, such as Kansas’s, require that the defendant either
knew or should have known their statements were deceptive.87 JONAH,
however, provides a clear route for meeting the knowledge requirement in
Kansas and similar states. As the court pointed out in excluding JONAH’s
experts, the evidence is “overwhelming” that homosexuality is a normal
variant of human sexuality.88 The plaintiffs also demonstrated through
experts and evidence that there is no science supporting the notion that
therapies designed to change an individual’s sexual orientation are
effective. Conversion therapists operating today, therefore, should know, at
least, that when they make either of the core misrepresentations, their
statements are considered false by the vast majority of the scientific
community.
A small number of states—Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Minnesota, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming—impose
either intent or knowledge requirements in their general prohibitions of
prohibited acts under their consumer fraud laws.89 In this most restrictive
86

Transcript of Trial at 209–10, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 16, 2015).
87
See Appendix.
88
Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12, at 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015).
89
See Appendix. Several other states require a showing of intent in cases of omission or
concealment of a material fact, or require intent under specific prohibitions irrelevant to the sale of
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scenario, theoretical plaintiffs could argue that defendants made a
statement knowing that there is a general consensus in the medical
community that their statements are false. Furthermore, plaintiffs could
show that therapist defendants intended potential clients to rely on their
statements, rather than the generally accepted opinion of the medical
community. Whether this misdirection can cross the line into knowingly
making a prohibited misrepresentation will be a question of law for the
courts of these few restrictive states.
I do not minimize the difficulty an intent requirement presents in those
few states where it does exist. Demonstrating that conversion therapists
know they are lying will not be easy. But the overwhelming weight of
scientific evidence, as synthesized in JONAH, creates a platform to argue
that therapists in these states knew that they could not support their
representations that homosexuality is abnormal and treatable with credible
evidence. The last logical step from there to intentional misrepresentation
belongs to future judges and juries.
E. Problem Jurisdictions
Certain outlier states’ consumer protection regimes raise questions
about their ability to sustain a JONAH-model suit against conversion
therapists not because of some specific protection for the services in
question, but because of specific provisions that may present obstacles to
rigorously protecting victims of conversion therapy within the jurisdiction.
Luckily, these problem jurisdictions are few in number.
Public Impact Requirements: Seven states—Colorado, Georgia,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, South Carolina, and Washington—
require a plaintiff in a consumer fraud action to prove not only that they
were defrauded, but also that the enterprise in question impacts the
marketplace or the public at large.90 The precise contours of this burden
vary from state to state and are outside the scope of this Essay; the nature
of conversion therapy, however, makes this additional burden less onerous
than in other cases where a business sells a legitimate product to a single
plaintiff in a fraudulent manner. Conversion therapists, as described in
Section II, use two core misrepresentations to defraud their clients. While
state-by-state requirements for showing a public impact may differ slightly,
the fraud inherent in conversion therapy affects the entire class of
individuals who purchase the service, regardless of the source of the
conversion therapy. See id.
90
See Rhino Linings USA, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Rhino Lining, Inc., 62 P.3d 142, 149 (Colo.
2003) [http://perma.cc/VGH8-34VB]; Pryor v. CCEC, Inc., 571 S.E.2d 454, 455 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)
[http://perma.cc/9JC9-4Y9U]; Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 313 (Minn. 2000)
[http://perma.cc/LD88-N5NU]; Nelson v. Lusterstone Surfacing Co., 605 N.W.2d 136, 141–42 (Neb.
2000) [http://perma.cc/Q44T-REGX]; Daisy Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Abbott, 473 S.E.2d 47, 49 (S.C.
1996) [http://perma.cc/8AJ4-48XN]; Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland
Bank, 647 N.E.2d 741, 744 (N.Y. 1995) [https://perma.cc/M2SS-XZZ6]; Hangman Ridge Training
Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 537 (Wash. 1986) [http://perma.cc/L7LH-LMAR].
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therapy or the method of its delivery. Therefore, while it may complicate a
future JONAH-model suit, a public impact requirement does not necessitate
failure.
Attorney’s Fees: Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, South Dakota, and
Wyoming do not allow plaintiffs to collect attorney’s fees in consumer
fraud actions.91 North Dakota and Ohio only allow plaintiffs to collect
attorney’s fees if they prove the defendants knowingly violated the law.92
This is a serious bar to plaintiff recovery. The defendants’ attorneys’ fees in
JONAH ran into the several millions of dollars—and, because defendants
do not bear the burden of proof in consumer fraud actions, this figure will
likely be higher for plaintiffs than for therapist defendants as a systematic
matter.93
Furthermore, a number of states employ statutory schema that force
consumers in failed actions to pay some or all of the defendants’ attorney’s
fees—typically in cases the court determines to be frivolous or cases filed
to create a competitive business advantage.94 Without an incentive to
represent clients who may have relatively small claims for compensatory
damages,95 plaintiffs may be hard-pressed to find lawyers willing to take on
their cases in the first place.96 And with the threat of paying defendants’
attorney’s fees in case of defeat, plaintiffs may be scared away from the
enterprise altogether. A judgment for millions of dollars in fees is also a
powerful hammer, capable of driving a conversion therapist out of the
market altogether. Depriving plaintiffs of this weapon seriously diminishes
the impact of any individual suit against any individual therapist.
While these heightened burdens and monetary barriers complicate
efforts to bring future JONAH-model cases, they exist in a minority of
states. In most others, the path is open for future plaintiffs and their lawyers
to bring suits against conversion therapists—and win.
III.

TOWARDS A NATIONAL CESSATION OF CONVERSION THERAPY

Having addressed the “could,” I wish to spend a few moments on the
somewhat trickier “should.” The remaining conversion therapists in the
91

See Appendix.
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-15-09 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)
[http://perma.cc/S52G-SVXH].
93
See Christopher Doyle, Judicial Liberal Bias Forces Jury to Convict JONAH in Trial with Deep
Ramifications, THE CHRISTIAN POST (July 6, 2015, 2:05 PM), http://www.christianpost.com/news/
judicial-liberal-bias-forces-jury-to-convict-jonah-in-trial-with-deep-ramifications-141221
[http://perma.cc/6RTV-RS4X].
94
See Appendix.
95
For example, the JONAH judgment totaled just over $70,000 after statutory trebling.
96
This is not to say that there are not incredible nonprofit organizations, such as the Southern
Poverty Law Center (SPLC) and Lambda Legal, which operate in the LGBT rights space and might
take on a conversion therapy case notwithstanding the lack of attorney’s fees. The JONAH legal team
was composed of the SPLC and two law firms working pro bono, and the team incurred millions of
dollars of fees between the three firms. That level of financial commitment is to be commended, but the
availability of attorney’s fees makes it possible to bring these sorts of cases without requiring the
unlimited pro bono commitment of two major law firms.
92
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United States are vulnerable to state-level consumer fraud claims
nationwide. With the proper resources, and the proper plaintiffs, litigation
could drive them out of business altogether. But should it? What is the best
way to go about encouraging a final end to this practice—through further
litigation, or through legislative action? Is some remnant practice
acceptable? Or should the goal be to eradicate the practice entirely?
The Southern Poverty Law Center’s LGBT Rights Project recently
listed some seventy conversion therapy providers, referrers, and
organizations still operating within the United States.97 This is a small
number, all things considered—a testament to the nation’s rapidly evolving
views of sexual orientation.
The core misrepresentations described in this Essay—that
homosexuality is both abnormal and changeable—are tactical positions of
extreme importance in the anti-LGBT movement. If the thought leaders of
this dying movement were to retreat from either of these two redoubts, they
would surrender one of the last principled positions from which they can
argue against extending equal rights to non-heterosexual individuals: the
position that non-heterosexuality is demonstrably inferior to
heterosexuality. To admit that homosexuality is neither a disease nor a
mental disorder, and that it is not a condition subject to treatment and
change, is to implicitly admit that the only basis for continued invectives
against the LGBT community is not in science, but in bigotry—be it rooted
in religious intolerance or irrational prejudice.
This reality has had a galvanizing effect on the remaining purveyors of
and hierophants for conversion therapy. In the JONAH case alone, the
defense brought leaders from three other major conversion therapy
associations (People Can Change, Northstar, and Joel 2:25) to testify on
behalf of JONAH. These organizations are part of an ecosystem designed
to maintain their perceived legitimacy—in their own eyes, arguably, as
much as in others’—for as long as possible. Supporters manufacture
“scientific studies” on sexual orientation through organizations like
NARTH, publish these studies in the “peer reviewed” Journal of Human
Sexuality (NARTH’s in-house publication, run by and for NARTH
members),98 and use these results to justify the activities of their outwardfacing advocacy groups such as Voice of the Voiceless99 and Parents and
97

See Conversion Therapy, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (July 3, 2015),
http://splcenter.org/conversion-therapy
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150703163624/http://www.splcenter.org/conversion-therapy].
98
See Research Division Report, NARTH INST., http://www.narth.com/#!cv/cdy2 (last visited Nov.
8, 2015) (inviting NARTH members to subscribe to and publish in the Journal of Human Sexuality)
[http://perma.cc/5TJW-WX86].
99
See About Us, VOICE OF THE VOICELESS, http://www.voiceofthevoiceless.info/about-us/ (last
visited Nov. 8, 2015) (“We are forming an international coalition of former homosexuals, persons who
experience unwanted SSA, and their families to fight against defamation and advance a positive image
of the ex-gay community, their families, and the therapists and ministries who support them.”)
[http://perma.cc/4DVC-DYZA].
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Friends of Ex-Gays and Gays.100 The leaders of these organizations use this
junk science to argue against conversion therapy bans in state legislatures
and defend the right to sell “therapy” services to vulnerable consumers.101
These efforts occasionally find success. While certain states have banned
the provision of conversion therapy to minors,102 many other proposed bans
have failed to become law.103 Divided legislatures at the state and national
level cannot be expected to put an end to this fraud.
Accordingly, litigation continues to be the best route towards national
cessation of conversion therapy. The science disproving its claimed
efficacy is already solid. Litigation connects this evidence with real
humans—real victims—and demonstrates the real harm these so-called
“therapists” do to the patients who entrust themselves to their care. Making
one’s case in a court of law and revealing this fraud to the communities that
still support conversion therapy, especially conservative religious
communities, serve an educative and reformative purpose.
Just as critically, if and as the practice of conversion therapy comes to
be seen less and less as a legal-if-distasteful choice for religious
conservatives and more and more as an opportunistic fraud on sincerely
religious individuals, politicians seeking to curb or ban the practice through
legislative action gain political cover—and the calculus changes for
politicians who would gladly defend a religious minority, but not a scam to
defraud the same. In time, the need for litigation will likely lessen as
legislative efforts gain momentum.
The litigation strategy contemplated by this Essay does leave a safe
harbor open to conversion therapists: free counseling provided by a
nonprofit or a religious provider. Take for instance the organization Joel
2:25. Jeremy Schwab, the founder of Joel 2:25 and a “success story
witness” in the JONAH case, testified that he envisioned Joel 2:25 to be a
“Christian version of JONAH.”104 In many ways this is indeed the case.
Joel 2:25 runs online support groups for men and women whose religious
beliefs conflict with their homosexuality, and these support groups engage
in certain of the practices used by JONAH therapists.105 Critically, however,
100

See Same Sex Attraction, PARENTS & FRIENDS OF EX-GAYS & GAYS,
http://www.pfox.org/resources/same-sex-attraction/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2015) (asserting that “we
know . . . there is no ‘gay gene’” and change is possible.”) [http://perma.cc/DN4T-XDS2].
101
See Christopher Doyle, As Many as Nine State Legislatures Have Now Rejected SOCE Therapy
Bans, VOICE OF THE VOICELESS (May 8, 2014), http://www.voiceofthevoiceless.info/as-many-as-ninestate-legislatures-have-now-rejected-soce-therapy-bans/ (describing Voice of the Voiceless’s efforts to
defeat state bans on the provision of conversion therapy to minors) [http://perma.cc/2VAT-FBLL].
102
Most recently Illinois, on August 20, 2015. Aditya Agrawal, Illinois Bans Gay Conversion
Therapy for Minors, TIME (Aug. 21, 2015), http://time.com/4006675/illinois-bans-gay-conversiontherapy-on-minors/ [http://perma.cc/VWP3-9Y3W].
103
See Cheryl Wetzstein, Gay ‘Conversion’ Therapy Bans Stall Across the Nation, THE
WASHINGTON TIMES (May 4, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/may/4/gayconversion-therapy-bans-stall-across-the-natio [http://perma.cc/N9Q9-98K9].
104
Transcript of Trial at 38–39, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 18, 2015).
105
See JOEL 2:25 INT’L, http://www.joel225.org (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
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Joel 2:25 does not charge for its services. The support groups are free.
There is no sale. And if there is no sale, there is no consumer fraud.
I consider this acceptable, if not unavoidable. Like all regulated evils,
conversion therapy will always exist in some form. No amount of legal
precedent and legislative action will serve to entirely eradicate certain
individuals’ belief that homosexuality is an illness subject to cure, and no
amount of societal change and public outreach will serve to convince all
LGBT men and women that their sexual orientation is not a defect to be
controlled, or corrected if possible. If this subset—this small and shrinking
subset—of the population wishes to pursue these ends inside the
churchyard and outside of the marketplace, then so be it. The law cannot
prevent every self-destructive act, and while these victims may still suffer
harm from undergoing this free conversion therapy, other potential victims
will be saved by starving the practice out of commercial existence. State
bans on the provision of conversion therapy to minors will continue to be
passed. Selling the service to adults will be considered fraud, punished by
million-dollar penalties and injunctive relief. The boundaries in which
conversion therapists will be able to lie without fear of reprisal will shrink,
either forcing them out of business or forcing them to alter their sales pitch
so drastically (disclaiming any chance of success at changing their patients’
orientations) as to be selling an entirely different service. In time—with
work—the practice will go extinct.
Conversion therapists ruin lives. They convince men and women they
are sick when they are healthy, and that they can be cured when there is
nothing to cure. They employ unethical and dangerous treatment methods
such as nudity and “healthy touch” which are unscientific at best and barely
disguised opportunities for erotic contact between therapist and patient at
worst. They fail to deliver their promised outcome—because they cannot
do so. This is fraud. There is no room for conversion therapists, their
services, or their misrepresentations in the American marketplace. For now,
at least one jury in New Jersey agrees. In time, with JONAH serving as a
model, many more will surely reach a similar verdict.
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APPENDIX: STATE CONSUMER FRAUD PROTECTION DETAILS106
Alabama (ALA. CODE §§ 8-19-1 -- 8-19-15 (Westlaw through Act 2015559))
Reliance
No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.
Intent

The general prohibition against deceptive acts
at ALA. CODE § 8-19-5 does not require intent
or knowledge. Certain specific prohibitions
unrelated to conversion therapy, however, do.

Attorney’s Fees

ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(a)(3). Note that this
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect
attorney fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

Available to the attorney general. ALA. CODE
§ 8-19-8(a).

Alaska (ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 45.50.471 -- 45.50.561 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 1st Reg. Sess. and 2nd Spec. Sess.))
Reliance
Reliance not required. See Odom v. Fairbanks
Mem’l Hosp., 999 P.2d 123, 132 (Alaska 2000)
(“Actual injury as a result of the deception is not
required.”)

106

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.50.537. Note this
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect
attorney fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 45.50.501(a), 45.50.535

This Appendix benefits from earlier work focusing on consumer protection laws by the National
Consumer Law Center and the American Bar Association. These earlier surveys can be found at
CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES (2009)
[https://perma.cc/K5AX-LP9D & https://perma.cc/K496-BKLT] and AM. BAR ASS’N, CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS (2013). This Appendix focuses on those laws most applicable to
conversion therapy cases, and includes updated statutes through 2015.
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Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1521 -- 44-1534 (Westlaw through
1st Reg. Sess. Of 52nd Legis.))
Reliance
Read into statute by state courts. See, e.g.,
Peery v. Hansen, 585 P.2d 574, 577 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1978) (“A prerequisite to . . . damages is
reliance on the unlawful acts.”).
Intent

Required in cases of omission or concealment
of a material fact. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441522(A).

Attorney Fees

If the prevailing plaintiff is the Attorney
General, attorney fees available. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 44-1534.

Equitable Relief

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1528(A)

Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-101 -- 4-88-115 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess. and 2015 1st Ex. Sess.))
Reliance
No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.
Intent

Not required by general prohibition in ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-88-107(a).

Attorney Fees

ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(e)–(f)

Equitable Relief

Available to the attorney general. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-88-113(a)(1).

California (CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750–1785 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 807
of 2015 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.))
Reliance
No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.
Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(e). Note this statute
permits prevailing defendants to collect attorney
fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(a)(2), (5)
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Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-1-101 -- 6-1-115 (West, Westlaw
through 1st Reg. Sess. of 70th Gen. Assemb.))
Reliance
Reliance not required. See Hall v. Walter, 969
P.2d 224 (Colo. 1998) (causation may be
demonstrated in consumer protection action
even if injured party did not rely on statements
of defendant).
Intent

Intent required by most prohibitions in statute.
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-105.

Attorney Fees

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-113(2)(b), (4).
Note this statute permits prevailing defendants
to collect attorney fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

Available to the Attorney General. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 6-1-110(1).

Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-110a -- 42-110q (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and June Spec. Sess.))
Reliance
Consumer need not prove reliance. See
Hinchliffe v. Am. Motors Corp., 440 A.2d 810,
815–16 (Conn. 1981).
Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(d)

Equitable Relief

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-110m, 42110g(a)

Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2511–2527, 2580–2584 (West,
Westlaw through 80 Laws 2015, Ch. 194))
Reliance
Reliance not required. See Stephenson v.
Capano Dev., Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1074 (Del.
1983).
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Intent

Required in cases of omission or concealment of
a material fact. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 2513(a).

Attorney Fees

No provision for fees in statute.

Equitable Relief

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2523
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District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3901 -- 28-3913 (West,
Westlaw through Oct. 21, 2015))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

Intent not required. See Fort Lincoln Civic Ass’n
v. Fort Lincoln New Town Corp., 944 A.2d
1055, 1073 (D.C. 2008).

Attorney Fees

D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(2)(B)

Equitable Relief

D.C. CODE ANN.
3905(k)(2)(D), (F)

§§ 28-3909(a),

28-

Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.201–501.213 (West, Westlaw through
2015 1st Reg. Sess. and Spec. A Sess. of 24th Leg.))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state cases
reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.2105. Note this
provision grants fees to prevailing party,
plaintiff or defendant.

Equitable Relief

Available to the enforcing authority. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 501.207(1)(b).

Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-390 -- 10-1-407 (West, Westlaw through
2015 Legis. Sess.))
Reliance

Reliance required. See Tiismann v. Linda Martin
Homes Corp., 637 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. 2006).

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(d). Note this statute
permits prevailing defendants to collect attorney
fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

Available to the attorney general. GA. CODE
ANN. § 10-1-397(b)(2).
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Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 480-1 -- 480-24 (West, Westlaw through
Act 243 of the 2015 Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-13(a)(1), (b)(1)

Equitable Relief

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 480-13(a)(2), (b)(2),
480-15

Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-601 -- 48-619 (West, Westlaw through
2015 1st Reg. and 1st Ex. Sess. of 63rd Leg.))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state cases
reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

Intent required for deceptive practices, including
acts of unconscionability. Idaho Code Ann. §§
48-603, 48-603C.

Attorney Fees

IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-606(1)(f), 48-607, 48608(5). Note this statute permits prevailing
defendants to collect attorney fees in certain
cases.

Equitable Relief

IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-606(1)(b), 48-608(1)

Illinois (815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/1–505/12 (West, Westlaw through
P.A. 99-484 of 2015 Reg. Sess.))
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Reliance

Reliance not required. See Connick v. Suzuki
Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584 (Ill. 1996).

Intent

Required in cases of omission or concealment
of a material fact. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
505/2.

Attorney Fees

815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10, 10a(c)

Equitable Relief

815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/7(a), 10a(c)
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Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-0.5-1 -- 24-5-0.5-12 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

Reliance required. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.54(a).

Intent

Intent required for major substantive violations.
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-3.

Attorney Fees

IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(a). Note this
provision grants fees to prevailing party,
plaintiff or defendant.

Equitable Relief

Available to the attorney general. IND. CODE
ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(c)(1).

Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 714H.1–714H.8 (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

Intent required. IOWA CODE ANN. § 714H.3(1).

Attorney Fees

IOWA CODE ANN. § 714H.5(2)

Equitable Relief

IOWA CODE ANN. § 714H.5(1)

Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-623 -- 50-640 (West, Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

Reliance not required. See KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-626(b).

Intent

The general prohibition against deceptive acts at
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-626(a) does not require
intent or knowledge. Certain specific
prohibitions unrelated to conversion therapy,
however, do.

Attorney Fees

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-634(e). Note this statute
permits prevailing defendants to collect attorney
fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-632(a), 50-634(a), 50634(c)
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Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 367.110 -- 367.993 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.220(3). Note this
provision grants fees to prevailing party,
plaintiff or defendant.

Equitable Relief

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 367.190, 367.220(1)

Louisiana (LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1401–51:1430 (Westlaw through 2014
Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A). Note this statute
permits prevailing defendants to collect attorney
fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

Available to the attorney general. LA. STAT.
ANN. § 51:1407(A).

Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 205-A -- 214 (Westlaw through 2015
1st Reg. Sess.))
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Reliance

Reliance may be required. See State v.
Weinschenk, 868 A.2d 200, 206 (“An act or
practice is deceptive if it is a material
misrepresentation, omission, act or practice that
is likely to mislead consumers acting
reasonably . . . .” (emphasis added)). But see id.
at ¶ 17, 714 A.2d at 209 (denying relief to
indirect purchasers who did not rely on the
manufacturers’ statements).

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 213(2)

Equitable Relief

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 §§ 209, 213(1)
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Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-101 -- 13-501 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

Reliance not required. See MD. CODE ANN.,
COM. LAW § 13-302.

Intent

The general prohibition against deceptive acts at
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-301(1) does
not require intent or knowledge. Certain specific
prohibitions, however, do. See id. § 13-301(10).

Attorney Fees

MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-408(b). Note
this statute permits prevailing defendants to
collect attorney fees in certain cases. See id.
§ 13-408(c).

Equitable Relief

Available to the attorney general. MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-403(c), 13-406.

Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 93A, §§ 1–11 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 124 of 2015 1st Ann. Sess.))
Reliance

Reliance not required. See Aspinall v. Philip
Morris Cos., 813 N.E.2d 476, 486 (Mass. 2004).

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 9(4), 11

Equitable Relief

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 4, 9(1), 11

Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.901–445.922 (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 2015, No. 172 of the 2015 Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

Reliance not required, except as by statute at
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.903(1)(bb).

Intent

Certain specific provisions, unrelated to
conversion therapy, require intent. See MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §445.903(1).

Attorney Fees

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.911(2)

Equitable Relief

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
445.910(2) 445.911(1)(b)

§§ 445.905(1),
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Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8.31, 325F.68–325F.70 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 1st Spec. Sess.))
Reliance

No reliance required. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 325F.69(1).

Intent

Requires intent that others rely on the prohibited
representations.
MINN.
STAT.
ANN.
§ 325F.69(1).

Attorney Fees

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31(3a)

Equitable Relief

MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8.31(3), 325F.70

Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-1 -- 75-24-27 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

Not available under statute; MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 75-24-15(3) provides for fee award to
prevailing defendant on showing of bad faith
filing.

Equitable Relief

Available to the attorney general. MISS. CODE
ANN. § 75-24-9.

Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.010–407.130 (West, Westlaw through
2015 Veto Sess. of 98th Gen. Assemb.))
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Reliance

Reliance not required. See Hess v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 220 S.W.3d 758, 774 (Mo.
2007).

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.025(1). Note this statute
permits prevailing defendants to collect attorney
fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.025(1), 407.100(1)
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Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-101 -- 30-14-142 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Sess.))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-131(2), 30-14133(3). Note these provisions grants fees to
prevailing party, plaintiff or defendant.

Equitable Relief

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-111(1), 30-14133(1)

Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1601 -- 59-1623 (West, Westlaw
through 1st Reg. Sess. of 104th Leg.))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1608(1), 59-1609

Equitable Relief

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1608(2), 59-1609

Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.600, 598.0903–598.0999 (West,
Westlaw through June 30, 2015))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state cases
reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

Intent required in some cases. NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 598.0915, 598.0923(2). But see id.
§ 598.0925(1)(a) (making an “assertion of
scientific, clinical or quantifiable fact” a
deceptive trade practice unless the person has
factually objective evidence substantiating the
statement).

Attorney Fees

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.600(3)(c)

Equitable Relief

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
598.0963(3), 598.0979

§§ 41.600(3)(b),
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New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A:1–358-A:13 (Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:11.

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:10(I)

Equitable Relief

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A:4(III)(a), 358A:10(I)

New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1–56:8-91 (West, Westlaw through
L.2015, c. 120 and J.R. No. 7))
Reliance

Reliance not required. See Gennari v. Weichert
Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 366 (N.J. 1997).

Intent

No intent requirement. See Gennari v. Weichert
Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 366 (N.J. 1997).

Attorney Fees

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19

Equitable Relief

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-8, 56:8-19

New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-1 -- 57-12-22 (West, Westlaw
through 1st Spec. Sess. of 52nd Leg.))
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Reliance

Reliance not required. See, e.g., Lohman v.
Daimler–Chrysler Corp., 166 P.3d 1091, 1098
(N.M. Ct. App. 2007).

Intent

Plaintiff must show that defendant knew or
should have known of the deceptive nature of
his statements under the New Mexico Unfair
Practices Act. Stevenson v. Louis Dreyfus
Corp., 811 P.2d 1308, 1311 (N.M. 1991).

Attorney Fees

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(C). Note this
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect
attorney fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-8, 57-12-10(A)
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New York (N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349–350-f-1 (McKinney, Westlaw
through L.2015, ch. 1–411))
Reliance

Reliance not required. See Oswego Laborers’
Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland
Bank, 647 N.E.2d 741, 745 (N.Y. 1995).

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h)

Equitable Relief

N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(b), (h)

North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-1 -- 75-49 (West, Westlaw
through ch. 266, excluding ch. 240–241, 246, 258–264, of 2015 Reg.
Sess.))
Reliance

Reliance required. See, e.g., Bus. Cabling, Inc.
v. Yokeley, 643 S.E.2d 63, 69 (N.C. Ct. App.
2007)

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-16.1. Note this
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect
attorney fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

Available to the attorney general. N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-14.

North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 51-15-01 -- 51-15-11 (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

Intent required. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 5115-02.

Attorney Fees

Collectible only if defendant knowingly
committed the conduct. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 51-15-09.

Equitable Relief

Available to the attorney general. N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 51-15-07.
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Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01–1345.13 (West, Westlaw through
2015 Files 1–29 of 131st Gen. Assemb. and 2015 State Issues 1–2))
Reliance

No state cases reading reliance into statute. Nonbinding precedent states reliance not required.
See Delahunt v. Cytodyne Techs., 241 F. Supp.
2d 827, 835 (S.D. Ohio 2003).

Intent

Intent not required; knowledge taken into
consideration in determining whether an act is
unconscionable. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.03(B).

Attorney Fees

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(F). Note this
statute limits recovery of attorney fees to
knowing violations, and permits prevailing
defendants to collect attorney fees in certain
cases.

Equitable Relief

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.07(A)(2),
1345.09(D)

Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 751–765 (West, Westlaw through
1st Sess. of 55th Leg.))
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Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

Most prohibitions require actual knowledge or
reason to know of the false or misleading
conduct. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 753.

Attorney Fees

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 761.1(A). Note this
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect
attorney fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

Available to the attorney general. OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 756.1(A)(2).
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Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 646.605–646.656 (West, Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess. effective through Oct. 5, 2015))
Reliance

Reliance required in cases of express
misrepresentations brought by the consumer. See
Feitler v. Animation Celection Inc., 13 P.3d
1044, 1047 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). Prosecutors do
not need to prove “actual confusion or
misunderstanding.” OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 646.608(3).

Intent

No intent requirement for most violations.
Knowledge required for unconscionable tactic
violations. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 646.605(9),
646.608(1).

Attorney Fees

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646.638(3). Note this
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect
attorney fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 646.632, 646.638(1)

Pennsylvania (73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-1 -- 201-9.3
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. Acts 1–51))
Reliance

Reliance required. See Toy v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 928 A.2d 186, 201 (Pa. 2007).

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2019.2(a)

Equitable Relief

73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-4,
201-9.2(a)

Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 6-13.1-1 -- 6-13.1-29 (West,
Westlaw through ch. 285 of Jan. 2015 Sess.))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13.1-5.2(d)

Equitable Relief

R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 6-13.1-5(a), 6-13.15.2(a)
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South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 -- 39-5-180 (Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a)

Equitable Relief

S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-50(a), 39-5-140(a)

South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-24-1 -- 37-24-35 (Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

Reliance not required for criminal actions.
Reliance required for civil actions. Nygaard v.
Sioux Valley Hosps. & Health Sys., 2007 SD 34,
¶ 33, 731 N.W.2d 184, 196–97 (“Patients’ civil
actions are governed by SDCL 37-24-31, which
specifically requires a causal connection
between the alleged violation and the damages
suffered. . . .”).

Intent

Intent required. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-246(1).

Attorney Fees

If the prevailing plaintiff is the attorney general,
attorney fees available. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 37-24-23.

Equitable Relief

Available to the attorney general. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 37-24-23.

Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-101 -- 47-18-129 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.))
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Reliance

Reliance not required. Messer Griesheim Indus.,
Inc. v. Cryotech of Kingsport, Inc., 131 S.W.3d
457, 469 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(e). Note this
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect
attorney fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-108(a), 47-18109(b)
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Texas (TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41–17.63 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

Reliance required. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.50(a)(1)(B).

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d). Note
that § 17.50(c) permits prevailing defendants to
collect attorney fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.47(a),
17.48(a), 17.50(b)(2)

Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-1 -- 13-11-23 (West, Westlaw through
2015 1st Spec. Sess.))
Reliance

No reliance requirement in statute; no state
cases reading reliance requirement into statute.

Intent

The general prohibition against deceptive acts at
UTAH CODE ANN § 13-11-4(1) does not require
intent or knowledge. Specific examples of
deceptive acts all require knowledge or
intention. See id. § 13-11-4(2).

Attorney Fees

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-17.5, 13-11-19(5).
Note the latter provision grants fees to
prevailing party, plaintiff or defendant.

Equitable Relief

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-17(1)(b), 13-1119(1)(b)

Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451–2466b (West, Westlaw through 1st
Sess. Of 2015–2016 Gen. Assemb.))
Reliance

Reliance not required. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 2461(b) (requiring a showing of either
reliance or damages caused by the consumer
fraud).

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2461(b)

Equitable Relief

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2458(a), 2461(b)
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Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-196 -- 59.1-207 (West, Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess.))
Reliance

Reliance required. See, e.g., Owens v. DRS Auto.
Fantomworks, Inc., 764 S.E.2d 256, 260 (Va.
2014) (“The VCPA, however, still requires
proof, in misrepresentation cases, of the
elements of reliance and damages.”).

Intent

No intent requirement. See, e.g., Owens v. DRS
Auto. Fantomworks, Inc., 764 S.E.2d 256, 260
(Va. 2014).

Attorney Fees

VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-204(B)

Equitable Relief

Available to the attorney general. VA. CODE
ANN. § 59.1-203(A).

Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.010–19.86.920 (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. And 1st–3rd Spec. Sess.))
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Reliance

Reliance not required, but proximate causation is
required. See Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v.
Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 170 P.3d 10, 22
(Wash. 2007) (“A plaintiff must establish that,
but for the defendant’s unfair or deceptive
practice, the plaintiff would not have suffered an
injury.”).

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.090

Equitable Relief

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.080(1),
19.86.090
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West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-5-101 -- 46A-5-107, 46A-6-101 - 46A-6-110, 46A-7-101 -- 46A-7-115 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.))
Reliance

Reliance required in private actions alleging
affirmative
misrepresentation.
Proximate
causation required in cases of omission or
concealment of material fact. W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 46A-6-106(b).

Intent

Required in cases of omission or concealment of
a material fact. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6102(7)(M).

Attorney Fees

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5-104. Note this
statute permits prevailing defendants to collect
attorney fees in certain cases.

Equitable Relief

W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-6-106(a), 46A-7108

Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.18 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 60))
Reliance

Reliance not required. Novell v. Migliaccio, 2008
WI 44, ¶¶ 27–29, 749 N.W.2d 544, 550.

Intent

No intent requirement in statute.

Attorney Fees

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.18(11)(b)(2)

Equitable Relief

Available to government departments. WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 100.18(11)(a), (d).

Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-101 -- 40-12-114 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Gen. Sess.))
Reliance

Reliance required. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12108(a).

Intent

Intent required. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-105.

Attorney Fees

Not available under statute.

Equitable Relief

Available to the enforcing authority. WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 40-12-106.

117

